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APPELLENTS' REPLY BRIEF
INTRODUCTION
Respondent does not dispute that one loaning money to
a motor vehicle dealer is entitled to the protection of the
dealer's bond required by Utah law.

Respondent contends, however,

that the Complaints in these actions were properly dismissed and
that Appellants should not be given leave to amend the Complaints
because Appellants supposedly alleged in their Complaints that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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they were joint venturers with Call Auto & Equipment Sales,
Inc. ("Call Auto"), the dealer covered by the bond issued by
Respondent, which supposed allegation Appellants should not
now be allowed to contradict by Amended Complaints, because
Appellants did not supposedly seek leave to amend their
Complaints in a timely fashion, and because even if the
Appellants were not joint venturers with Call Auto but rather
made loans to Call Auto, that such loans were supposedly
usurious and Appellants cannot recover anything on the trans·
actions, not even the principal amount of the loans.

For

the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is respectfully submitted that these contentions are without merit and that
the Judgments appealed from should be reversed.
I.

APPELLANTS HAVE NOT JUDICIALLY ADMITTED THEY WERE

JOINT VENTURERS WITH DEFENDANT CALL AUTO.
Respondent argues (R.B. 6-7) 1 that Appellants have
alleged in their Complaints that they were engaged in joint
ventures with Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc. , and that such
allegations constitute judicial admissions so that there was
no issue to be determined by the Court or Jury concerning the
relationship between the parties.

This contention is ground·

less for a number of reasons.

1 Respondent's Brief is cited as "R. B.
".
Appellants' Opening Brief is cited a~Bo
The Betenson record is cited as "B.R.
,,.....Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

Appellants Have Not Alleged In Their Complaints

That They Were Engaged In Joint Ventures With Call Auto.
Respondent claims that in paragraph 7 of the Betenson
Complaint, Appellants have alleged the existence of a joint
venture between the parties.

As is clear from a reading of

that paragraph, the Betenson Appellants simply allege therein
the representations which were made

2z

Defendants when they

approached Appellant Betenson for money.

The paragraph does

not allege that a joint venture was entered into or ever
existed between the parties.

To the contrary, the factual

allegations contained in paragraph 7 make it clear that the
"joint venture" term used by the Defendants in soliciting
Appellants did not accurately describe the relationship at
all.

Thus, it is alleged that Defendants solicited Plaintiff

Betenson for the purpose of raising funds for the corporate
Defendants which those Defendants needed to purchase equipment
in their business.

It is further alleged that the money would

be at all times fully secured and that Plaintiff Betenson
would receive a guaranteed profit.

No where is there any allega-

tion that any of the Appellants would have anything to do with
the ownership, management or operation of the business or have
any right of control over that business or that the return on
Appellants' money would in any way be dependent upon the amount
of profits earned in the business or that Appellants would be
responsible in any way for any losses of the business.

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Under the authorities cited in our opening Brief
(A.B. 9-15), it is clear that the foregoing allegations do
not constitute allegations sufficient to give rise to the
creation of a joint venture.

The fact that Defendants used

the term "joint venture" in soliciting one of the Appellants
is totally irrelevant.

The situation is no different than

if Defendants had solicited Appellants to give them a "gift"
of $5, 000. 00 on the condition that within one year Defendants
would guarantee to repay that "gift" with a guaranteed profit.
The mere characterization of the transaction as a "gift" would
be meaningless and it would be clear to everyone that the
transaction legally constituted a loan.
Paragraph 9 of the Betenson Complaint makes it even
more clear that the Betenson Appellants have not alleged that
1

they entered into a joint venture with any of the Defendants:"
"On or about April 4, 1980, Plaintiff Eddy N.
Betenson • • . entered into a written agreement with Defendant Call Auto & Equipment Sales,
Inc . • • . pursuant to which Betenson agreed
to and did pay to said Defendant the sum of
$7,000.00, which was to be utilized by said
Defendant to purchase and sale various types
of personal property and equipment in its
business. In consideration for such payment,
said Defendant agreed and guaranteed to pat
to Betenson in various install~ents on or efore
Ju
t e sum o
to ive
to

2 The same standard allegations are contained in the Complair.:
for the other loans made by the Betenson Appellants.
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ersonal ro ert and e ui ment as securit
or sue investment . . . . T erea ter t e
parties agreed to various extensions for the
repayment of the final installment of $7,000.00
to September 8, 1980." [Emphasis added]
Nowhere in this paragraph is there any allegation of the creation of a joint venture between the parties, but simply the
allegation of a debtor-creditor relationship between the parties.
In addition, even if Respondent were correct that
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Betenson Complaint allege the creation of a joint venture between the parties,
contains no such allegations.

the~

Complaint

The transaction in which Mr.

and Mrs. Lowin loaned money to Call Auto was completely
separate from the transactions alleged in the Betenson Complaint
and none of the Betenson Appellants had any involvement whatsoever in the Lowin transaction.

Paragraph 7 of the

~

Complaint simply alleges that the Lowins entered into a
written agreement with Call Auto pursuant to which they paid
Call Auto $30,000.00, which was to be utilized by Call Auto
to purchase, refurbish and sell personal property and equipment in its business and that in consideration therefor Call
Auto agreed to pay Plaintiffs the sum of $750.00 per month
until April 26, 1981, at which time the Lowins would be repaid
the $30,000.00, and that Plaintiffs' money would at all times
be secured.

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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B.

Even If Appellants Had Alleged In The Origin!!_

Complaints That A Joint Venture Existed, Such Allegation Woulc
Not Constitute A Judicial Admission Barring The Filing Of
An Amended Complaint.

Even if Appellants had alleged in their original
Complaints that a joint venture existed between the parties,
Respondent's contention that such allegation constitutes a
"Judicial admission" which is binding upon Appellants and
that Appellants cannot amend their Complaints to plead facts
"in direct contradiction" to the facts alleged in their orig·
inal Complaints is erroneous.

3

In the first place, the allegation that a "joint
venture" existed would clearly be a conclusion of law and not
a factual allegation.

Neither the parties nor the Court are

bound by conclusions of law contained in pleadings and legal
conclusions cannot be judicial admissions.

See, ~· GiaMo:<

v. United States Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544 (3rd Cir. 1956);
Jones v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 18 F.R.D. 181 (M.D. Penn. 1955).
More importantly, the fact that a pleader seeks to
contradict factual allegations contained in a prior pleading

3 In this connection, Respondent claims that Appellants
"submitted the matter for decision to the lower Court upor.
the premise that a joint venturer is entitled to recover
against a dealer's bond". This argument, a~ ResI?or_ident f''
well knows completely misstates Appellants position be.-·
'
·
tl Y and uni·b
the District
Court. Appe 11 ants h ave consisten
formly contended that no joint venture existed between t.~.
parties, that the transactions we:e loar_is and that onermalv
a loan to a motor vehicle dealer is entitled to recove
under the dealer's bond. ~. ~.B.R. 130 & 158 ·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is not a basis for denying leave to amend unless leave is sought
in bad faith or unless leave to amend would seriously prejudice
the other party.
For example, in Beeck v. Aquaslide "N" Dive Corp.,
67 F.R.D. 411 (M.D. Ill. 1975), the Defendant had filed an
Answer admitting that it manufactured the slide on which
Plaintiff was injured.

Over a year later, Defendant sought

leave to amend its Answer to deny that it manufactured the
slide.

The Court granted leave to amend on the basis that it

did not appear that Defendant was acting in bad faith and
Plaintiff would not be unduly prejudiced by the amendment.
Similarly, in United Steel Workers of America,
A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Mesker Bros. Industries, Inc., 457 F.2d 91
(8th Cir. 1972), the Plaintiff had alleged in its original
Complaint that "in car"t"ying out its collective bargaining
obligations" under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the Defendant employer had obtained an insurance policy
insuring Plaintiff with respect to certain injuries.

On the

basis of such allegation, the lower Court had dismissed the
Complaint because the Complaint itself indicated that the
Defendant had complied with its obligations under the collective
bargaining agreement to obtain insurance.

The Plaintiff moved

to amend its Complaint, contending that it was not their intention to imply that the coverage which Defendant had actually
obtained did in fact meet the requirements of the collective
bargaining agreement.

The District Court refused to allow

-7-
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Plaintiff leave to amend.

The Court of Appeals reversed the

District Court and allowed Plaintiff leave to amend to clear
up any ambiguity.
Finally, in Jackson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co,
212 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1950), the Plaintiff brought an action to
recover for injuries suffered in a truck accident.

The orig·

inal Complaint alleged that an employee/ employer relationship
existed between Plaintiff and Defendant, which relationship
would completely bar Plaintiff's action as the Workmen's
Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy.
Court had sustained a

The lower

demurrer to the Complaint without leave

to amend on the basis that Plaintiff could not contradict the
allegation of an employer/employee relationship contained in
the Complaint.

The Appellate Court reversed and granted leave

to amend stating:
"The province and purpose of the law is to
ascertain the real facts and to administer
justice in the light of such facts. It would
seem to be a travesty on justice if a litigant
had inadvertently, ignorantly and erroneously
stated as a fact, without fault on his part,
an admission against interest, if he were to
become bound thereby and would not be permitted
upon proper showing to correct the innocent error
and assert the true fact in that regard.
II

"If courts were to bind litigants to inadvertent
untrue statements of facts and forbid them the
inherent right to correct faults by substituting
the true facts, they would become partisans to
miscarriages of justice. Our courts not only
permit, but strive to elicit, .the true fa~ts of
all cases and to render justice by applying
the law t~ such facts." (Id. at 594-95)
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To the same effect,

~Macomber

v. State of California, 58

Cal.Rptr. 393 (Cal. 1967) ("rules of pleading are conveniences
to promote justice and not to impede or warp it."); Avalon
Painting Co. v. Alert Lumber Co., 44 Cal.Rptr. 90 (Cal. 1965);
Freidberg v. Freidberg, 88 Cal.Rptr. 451 (Cal. 1970); Bank
of America v. Lamb Finance Co., 303 P.2d 86 (Cal. 1956)
(amendment should be allowed to "clarify ambiguities, amend,
insufficiencies, eliminate surplusage or explain mistaken
statements, if any."); 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, §15.08(2]
at p. 1571.
Nor do the authorities cited by Respondent in support
of its contention that Appellants cannot amend to "contradict"
the "judicial admission that a joint venture existed" support
that position.

In Estate of Clarence Henry McFarland v. Holt,

417 P.2d 244 (Ut. 1966), cited by Respondent, the Executrix
under a will petitioned for an Order confirming the sale of
real property.

The Court entered an Order of Confirmation

pursuant to such request.

The Executrix subsequently sought to

set aside such Order on the basis that her own petition filed
to confirm the sale had been insufficient.

The Court held

that her petition had in fact been sufficient and further noted
that the Executrix should not thereafter be permitted to repudiate the petition for the purpose of upsetting the action which
the Court had taken.
pleadings.

That case has nothing to do with amending

In Myers v. Carter, 556 P.2d 703 (Ore. 1976), cited

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by Respondent, the case had actually been tried before a Jury
·
with the admission contained in the pleading and no leave to
amend was ever sought.

Thus, the Court held that it was error

to submit the issue to the jury for decision which had already
been admitted in the pleadings.
In summary, Appellants do not believe that they

alle~,

in their original Complaints that a joint venture existed.
However, if this Court rules otherwise, Appellants should be
given the opportunity to amend their Complaints to clarify
their previous allegations.

Such a ruling would clearly be in

the interest of justice as it would result in the determinatio:
of the merits of this claim on the facts rather than on the
form of the pleadings and there is absolutely no showing that
such amendment is being sought in bad faith or that Respondent
would be prejudiced in any manner by such amendment.
II.

APPELLANTS ARE NOT BOUND BY THE "JOINT VENTURE"

LANGUAGE OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENTS.
Respondent states in its Brief (R.B. 13) that Appella:
contend that although the written agreements expressly provide
for a joint venture, Appellants should be allowed to introduc•
evidence that the parties to the agreements intended otherwise
This is a misstatement of Appellants' position.

Appellants

contend that the terms of the written agreements themselves
clearly do not constitute a joint venture, but even if such
terms did constitute a joint venture, based upon the authoriti'
cited in our opening Brief (A.B.8-12), Appellants are entitleG
to introduce evidence that in fact a joint venture was not
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intended by the parties and did not in fact exist.
Respondent admits that the provisions of the written
agreements are not determinative on the existence of a joint
venture between the parties to the written agreements, but
argues that the "joint venture" language of the agreements is
binding upon Appellants as to Respondent who was not a party
to the agreements.

The cases cited by Respondent do not

support this contention.
In James Weller, Inc. v. Hansen, 517 P.2d 1110
(Ariz. App. 1973), a case cited by Respondent, the Court simply
held that although between the parties to a contract their
intent to form a joint venture is essential, "as to third
parties, the relation will be determined from the facts rather
than the conclusions of the co-partners as to the nature of
their business relationship."

(Id. at 1115)

There was no

contention that the terms of the written agreement did not
accurately set forth the true relationship that existed between
the parties.

Thus, the Court examined the written contract

between the two claimed joint venturers and determined that
the agreement by which the house was to be built and sold and
the parties were each to receive one-half of the profits from
such enterprise in fact constituted a joint venture agreement.
In determining that a joint venture existed, the Court set
forth the elements of a joint venture as follows:
"(l) a contract, (2) a common purpose, (3) a
community of interest, and (4) an equal right
of control • . .
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"~t must appear as a part of the agreement
either expressly or by necessary implication,
that each of the parties to such joint adventure has authority to act for all in respect
to the control of the means or agencies employed
to execute such cormnon purpose.
II

"Where there is a question of a joint adventure
each case must be decided upon its own facts . . '."
(Id at 1115)
The Weller Court simply determined from the facts
concerning the relationship between the parties that a joint
venture existed.

Appellants in the case at bar simply ask

for the opportunity to factually prove that no joint venture
existed.
In Stearns v. Williams, 240 P.2d 833 (Id. 1952), a
case cited by Respondent, the Court simply held that as to
third persons not a party to the contract, "the legal and not
the actual intention controls."

(Id. at 839)

In other words,

as to third persons, even if the parties to the contract did
not actually intend to create a joint venture, if the facts
show the relationship constitute a joint venture, then as to
third parties a joint venture would exist.

Again, the Court

in Stearns recognized that whether a joint venture existed is
primarily a question of fact and that the parties to a joint
venture must have a unity of interest in the objects or pur·
poses of the agreement.
In Utah, the circumstances under which a person may
be bound as a partner

(or a joint venturer) by estoppel even

though no partnership in fact existed are spelled out by
0

statute.

Section 48-1-13, Utah Code Anno. (1953), provides

lf or consents to another';
.
that where a person represents h imse

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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representing him to anyone as a partner, that even though he
is not an actual partner he is liable to any person to whom
the representation has been made who relied upon such representation in giving credit to the partnership.

It is settled

under the Utah statute that in order to make one a partner
or a joint venturer by estoppel, it is absolutely essential
that the third party have relied on the representation of
partnership.

Phillips Manufacturing Co. v. Putnam, 405 P.2d

1376 (Ut. 1973).
In the present case, it is clear that even if the
intention of Appellants and Call Auto is disregarded, the terms
of the agreements between the parties and the facts of the
relationship that actually existed are not such as to legally
constitute a joint venture, but, rather, show a debtor/creditor
relationship between the parties.

Furthermore, under the Utah

statute, it is clear that Respondent in no way relied upon the
"joint venture" language in the agreements either in issuing
the dealer's bond in favor of Call Auto approximately two years
prior to the first transaction with Appellants, or in continuing
that bond in effect.
III.

APPELLANTS DID TIMELY MOVE FOR LEAVE TO

AMEND THEIR COMPLAINTS IN THE COURT BELOW.
Respondent argues that Appellants did not move for
leave to amend their Complaints prior to the entry of the Orders
of Dismissal and that even though Appellants' Motions for

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Reconsideration or Modification stated as ground for the
Motions that Appellants were entitled to amend the Complaints,
such motions were improper and leave to amend could not have
been granted by the Court both because the Court could not
properly reconsider its prior ruling and because leave to amer.:
a Complaint cannot be granted after the Complaint has already
been dismissed.

These contentions are without merit.

First, Appellants' counsel did in fact, at the
hearing on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, request leave to
amend the Complaints in the event the District Court felt that
the original Complaints were defective.

When, after taking th;

matter under advisement, the District Court granted the Motior.:
to Dismiss

~Prejudice,

Appellants immediately filed a

"Motion for Reconsideration or Modification of Order Granting
Motion to Dismiss", in which Appellants sought once again leali
to amend the Complaints in the event the Court felt the Com·
plaints were deficient.

The Trial Court denied these motions.

Only then did the Court direct the entry of final judgments
of dismissal of the Complaints against Respondent.
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b),
it is clear that until the Court directed the entry of final
Judgment in favor of Respondent based upon an express deter·
mination that no just reason existed for delay, that the Court
was free to allow Appellants to amend their Complaints or to
revise its previous Orders in any respect as the previous
of the Court did not dispose of all of the claims of all
parties to the action.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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IV.

THE LOANS MADE BY APPELLANTS WERE NOT USURIOUS

AND EVEN IF THE LOANS WERE USURIOUS RECOVERY IS NOT BARRED.
Respondent's final argument is that even if the
Appellants were not joint venturers with, but rather loaned
money to, Call Auto, Appellants are barred from recovery because under the provisions of the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit
Code the loans were supposedly "consumer related" loans, and,
therefore, usurious, void and unenforceable because the finance
charge exceeded 18%.

With respect to Mr. and Mrs. Lowin, for

example, Respondent argues that even though they loaned Call
Auto $30,000.00 and were repaid only $750.00, that they are
barred from any recovery in this action.
It simply is not true that the loans made by
Appellants to Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc. were "consumer
related" loans.

Section 70B-3-602(1), Utah Code Ann.

(1953),

defines "consumer related loans" as:
" • • • a loan which is not subject to the
provisions of this act applying to consumer
loans and in which the principal does not
exceed $25,000.00; if the debtor is a person
other than an organization." [Emphasis added]
The loans in this action were solicited by Call Auto, the
interest rates were set by Call Auto without negotiation, the
loans were made to Call Auto and the loan agreements were
executed by Call Auto.

Respondent attempts to avoid the fact

that the loans were made to a corporation, arguing that the
loans were in fact made to the individual Defendants because
Appellants allege in their Complaints, upon information and
belief, that at all relevant times Call Auto was the alter ego
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the individual Defendants and the separate entity of that
corporation should be disregarded.
sequitur.

This argument is a non

The fact that the individual Defendants may have

failed to observe the required corporate formalities and that
the Court may find that it would sanction a fraud or promote
injustice to recognize the separate corporate entity insofar as
liability to Appellants is concerned, has nothing to do with
the existence of the corporation to whom Appellants made the
loans as a legal entity for other purposes.

A party certainly

cannot avoid liability for a loan by his own formation and
operation of a sham corporation.
Moreover, even if the loans had been usurious that
fact would not render them void and unenforceable as contended
by Respondent.

The sole authority cited by Respondent for this

proposition, Ross v. Producers Mutual Co., 295 P. 2d 339 (Ut.
provides absolutely no support for Respondent's claim.

lj

In

Ross, the Court held that the fact that an insurance company
had violated §31-27-15 U.C.A., in issuing a policy, did not
render the entire contract of insurance void.

In reaching that

conclusion, this Court noted that in determining whether viola·
tion of a statute renders a contract void, the primary consider'
tion is whether the statute construed as a whole indicates the
Legislature intended such a result.

In a footnote the Court

cited as an example of a statute which contained an express
provision rendering such a contract void, Utah's former Usury
. A.
Statute, 15 - 1 - 6 , U .C.

However, that statute was repealed
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in 1955.

4
In fact, the remedies available to one paying

usurious interest are expressly spelled out in the Utah
Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
Ann.

Section ?OB-5-202(3), Utah Code

(1953), provides that the debtor is entitled to a refund

of the excess charge and, under Section ?OB-5-202(4), the
debtor can recover a penalty if the demand for refund is not
complied with in a reasonable time.

Section 70B-5-202(5)

goes on to make it clear that the loan is not void by providing
that, "Except as otherwise provided, no violation of this Act
impairs rights on a debt."
Call Auto solicited and obtained loans from Appellants
and numerous other people at the excessive interest rates set
by Call Auto without negotiation.

Certainly, Appellants and

the other parties who loaned money to Call Auto were naive and
gullible to believe that Call Auto could or would repay their
money let alone pay such interest rates.

However, that fact

certainly should not preclude Appellants from recovery and
neither Call Auto nor Respondent can avoid liability on the
basis that the loans were usurious.

4 In an apparent attempt to prejudice the Court, R7spo~dent
cites §70B-5-301, Utah Code Anno. (1953), as making i~ ~
misdemeanor to willfully charge more than the usury ll.Illit.
However, the statute only applies to a person.who engages
in the business of making consumer loans and is clearly
inapplicable to Appellants.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants simply ask to be given the opportunity to
prove at trial what is not disputed by any of the parties to
the transactions, i.e., that Appellants made secured loans to
Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc. , and that the parties neither
intended to nor did in fact enter into a joint venture with
respect to Call Auto's business.

Even the cases cited by

Respondent in its Brief demonstrate that the existence of a
joint venture is a factual question which must be answered
by an examination of the entire relationship of the parties.
Such a factual inquiry is clearly in the interest of justice
and the inquiry should not be artificially limited because of
the use of the term "type of joint venture" in Call Auto's
form agreements or because the Betenson Complaint may not be
entirely clear as to whether a joint venture is alleged.
DATED this

-:fl.~ day of August, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,
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